Credibility Discounting in the Theory of Approximate Reasoning by Yager, Ronald R.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
301 
Credibility Discounting in 
the Theory of Approximate Reasoning 
Ronald R. Yager 
Machine Intelligence Institute, Iona College 
New Rochelle, NY 10801 
ABSTRACT 
We are concerned with the problem of introducing 
credibility type information into reasoning systems. 
The concept of credibility allows us to discount 
information provided by agents. An important 
characteristic of this kind of procedure is that a 
complete lack of credibility rather than resulting in the 
negation of the information provided results in the 
nullification of the information provided. We suggest 
a representational scheme for credibility qualification in 
the theory of approximate reasoning. We discuss the 
concept of relative credibility. By this idea we mean to 
indicate situations in which the credibility of a piece of 
evidence is determined by its compatibility with higher 
priority evidence. This situation leads to structures 
very much in the spirit of nonmonotonic reasoning. 
1. Introduction 
In the construction of automated systems which 
aggregate and reason with pieces of evidence, an 
important consideration is the amount of credibility 
associated with the individual pieces of evidences. 
Credibility qualification is distinct for other forms of 
qualification such as probabilistic and possibilistic (see 
Prade [1] for a comprehensive discussion of these kinds 
of qualifications). One manifestation of this distinction 
is that zero credibility reflects itself into a total lack of 
knowledge, rather than the negation or dual of the 
original knowledge as is the case in probability. Thus 
if an agent says that it is raining and if I assign no 
credibility to this agent's information rather then 
concluding it is not raining, I conclude nothing about 
the weather. In this regard, the operation of credibility 
qualification acts like an importance operator in multi­
criteria decision making [2-6]. 
Another interesting characteristic of credibility 
qualification is that in some cases the credibility 
assigned to a piece of evidence can be a function of its 
compatibility with other, higher priority evidence. We 
call such credibility assignments relative credibility 
values. The structure of such credibility formulations 
cap be seen to be very much in the spirit and form of 
nonmonotonic logic.[7] These types of structures play 
an important role in allowing credibility assignments to 
adjudicate and relieve conflicts between sources of 
information by allowing us to withdraw less credible 
information when it directly conflicts with more reliable 
information. In such cases the credibility of a piece of 
information can be said to be context dependent 
We shall specifically look at the issue of credibility 
qualification in the framework of Zadeh's theory of 
approximate reasoning [8). We shall consider the 
situation where credibility is context dependent. In this 
situation, we shall draw upon Yager's work on 
nonmonotonic reasoning [9, 10]. In a more 
comprehensive study (4] we look at the issue of 
credibility qualification in the Dempster-Shafer theory 
of evidence [11, 12]. 
2. Credibility and Discounting in 
Approximate Reasoning 
In this section we shall investigate the issue of 
credibility and discounting in the theory of approximate 
reasoning. A detailed discussion of the theory of 
approximation reasoning {AR) can be found in (8]. 
Assume V is a variable taking its value in the set 
X. A proposition (piece of knowledge) in AR is a 
statement of the form 
Vis A. 
where A is a fuzzy subset of X. The semantics of the 
above statement is to express the knowledge that the 
value of V lies in the set A. More formally, as 
described by Zadeh [13], such a statement induces a 
possibility distribution on X such that for each x e X, 
A(x) indicates the possibility that V assumes the value 
X. 
In AR if we have a collection of propositions Pt, 
P2, ... P0 each of the form Vis Aj, we indicate that a 
proposition P is inferable from our knowledge base as 
(Pt. Pz, . . . Pn) .... p 
Specifically we can infer any proposition of the 
form V is B where B is any set such that 
where 
B(x) = D(cx,A(x)) 
then it is always the case that 
B(x)� A(x) 
that is A c B. 
The following theorem relates the inference process 
to the discounting process. 
Theorem : Reducing the credibility of any of the 
propositions in a knowledge base decreases the 
collection of valid inferences. 
While a reduction of credibility has the effect of 
diminishing the number of valid inferences on one hand 
on the other hand it can play a significant role in 
reducing conflict between propositions in the knowledge 
base. As we shall subsequently see when we discuss 
the concept of relative credibility the use of credibility 
discounting can allow us to adjudicate and subsequently 
eliminate conflicting propositions in a systematic 
manner. 
We have assumed that the credibility associated 
with a proposition was a precise number in the unit 
interval. In some cases our knowledge about the 
credibility associated with a proposition may not be 
good enough to allow us to so precisely indicate the 
value of a. In these cases, we may find it useful to use 
a linguistic value to indicate the credibility of a 
proposition. 
Consider the proposition 
V is A is a credible 
where a is a linguistic value such as "high", "low", 
"about 6". In this environment, we can represent a as a 
fuzzy subset of the unit interval. In this case for each y 
e [0,1], a(y) indicates the degree to which y satisfies 
the concept, linguistic value, conveyed by a. Some 
examples of notable linguistic values are shown in the 
figure 1. 
In this environment, with a a linguistic value, the 
proposition 
V is A is a credible 
again induces an unqualified statement 
Vis B 
where 
B(x) = D(a ,  A(x)) = S(a, A(x)) 
In this situation a is defmed such that 
a(y) = a(l -y). 
In this case a is the antonym of a . This definition 
preserves the fact that 
a=l-a. 
In this, since a is a fuzzy subset, it turns out that 
B(x) becomes a fuzzy membership grade. That is, B 
becomes a type II fuzzy subset, one with fuzzy 
membership grade. 
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"high" 
"close to 5" 
"low" 
"unknown" 
Figure#l 
Consider the situation where we use for S the max 
operator, then 
B(x) = a v A(x) = a 
In this case 
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B(x) = Uy { 
1- a(y)}· 
· y v A(x) 
If we used 
D(x) =aa 
then we would get 
B(x) - u { a(y) } y (A(x))Y . 
The following example will illustrate the 
calculation of B from A and a in the case where a is a 
fuzzy value. 
Example : Let X =(a, b, c}. Assume we have the 
proposition 
V is A is a credible. 
Let 
A = {....6. l ...8..} a' b' c 
and assume a has the value "low" where low is defined 
by 
"low" = {l l ...2. ...i ..2.} 
0' .1' .2' .3'.4. 
This proposition then induces a new proposition 
VisB 
where B is a second order fuzzy set. Using the max 
type discounting function we get 
B(x) =(a v A(x)) 
In this example 
a= r...£ � � l 11 
.6' .7' .8' .9'1 
Introducing this value into B(x) we get 
ura\-{...2_ ...i ...2. ..1... l}v{..L} - {...£ ...i ....2. ..1...1} 
JJ\1'1""" .6' .7' .8' .9'1 .6 - .6' .7' .8' .9'1 
B(b) = r...£ � � l 11 v rlJ = rl1 
.6'.7'.8'.9'1 1 1 
B(c) - {..2_ ...i ...2. ..L lJ v {..L} - { ...2. l lJ .6' .7' .8' .9'1 .8 - .8' .9'1 
3. Relative Credibility 
In the previous section we associated with each 
proposition a value a e [0,1] indicating the credibility 
we assigned to that piece of knowledge. The a value 
played a central role in determining how much we 
discounted the information provided in that proposition. 
This value was used simply as a measure of the 
credibility of the agent supplying the information. In 
this section, we shall consider the credibility assigned to 
a piece of evidence as determined by the compatibility 
of the piece of evidence with a collection of other pieces 
of evidence. 
Assume we have a knowledge base consisting of 
P1, P2, ... P0• Let 
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P: VisE 
be a piece of evidence whose credibility a is denoted 
a= C(P1, P2, ... P0). 
In this framework the P1, ... P0 are called the 
preeminent knowledge associated with this piece of 
evidence. This formulation is meant to indicate that the 
discounting associated with the proposition V is E, its 
a value, is determined by the compatibility of the 
proposition, V is E, with the preeminent knowledge. 
In order to obtain the compatibility of our 
proposition with its preeminent knowledge, we use the 
measure of possibility [ 13] of the knowledge given the 
preeminent knowledge 
CpCP1, P2, ... P0) = Poss[ P/P1 n P2 n . .  
. Pn] 
Assuming each Pj is of the form 
Vis Aj 
then 
Cp<P1. P2, ... P0) = Maxx [A 1 (x) A A2(x) . 
• • •  A An(x) 1\ E(x)]. 
If we denote 
A=njAj 
then 
a= S,(P1, P2, ... Pn) = Poss [VisE IV 
is A] = Maxx [A(x) "E(x)]. 
Thus we see that the larger the degree of 
intersection between the knowledge of concern and its 
preeminent knowledge, the less we discount, the larger 
a value associated with the knowledge P. It should be 
carefully noted that the process of calculating a 
involves the whole of the sets P and A. This process is 
very much in the spirit of non-monotonic logics. [7]. 
Having obtained this a value then the piece of 
knowledge, V is E, gets discounted, and translated into 
VisF 
where as before 
F(x) = S(a; E(x)). 
However since in this case 
a= Poss[E/A] 
we get 
F(x) = S(l - Poss[E/A], E(x)). 
Furthermore if we use the max operator for S than 
F(x)= E(x) v (1- Poss(E/A)) 
If we use the exponential model then 
F(x) = E(xloss[E/A]_ 
We note using this general formalism that if 
Poss[E/A] = 1 than no discounting takes place. On the 
other hand if Poss[E/A] = 0 complete discounting has 
occwred. 
In a more general sense, we can express the 
relationship between a and Poss[EIAJ in a functional 
manner, ie 
a= g(Poss(EIA)J 
where g is monotonically increasing function. If g( l )  < 
I then the evidence is discounted even if it is 
completely compatible. with the preeminent knowledge 
We first note that if for all x 
g(x) =a 
then we are essentially in the situation of the previous 
section, one in which a is the absolute measure of 
credibility and is not effected by the preeminent 
knowledge. In the special case where 
a = I then the information is not discounted at all. 
4. Alternative Interpr etations of 
Credibility 
In the previous sections, when faced with a 
proposition whose credibility was less than complete 
we discounted the information provided by the 
proposition essentially by making less specific the 
information provided. Thus given 
V is A is a credible 
we derived the information 
Vis A+ 
where 
A +(x) � A(x) for x. 
Fundamentally, we ended up with another, although less 
informative, proposition of the same type. One way of 
viewing the effect of this operation is in terms of 
possibility and certainty measures[ 15]. In particular we 
recall that for any subset F 
Poss[V is F I V  is E] = Maxx[F(x) A E(x)J 
Cert[V is F I V  is EJ =1 - Poss[F/EJ 
Since A* (x) � A(x) then for all subsets B 
Poss[V is Bl V is A +J � Poss[V is B I V is 
A] 
Cert[V is B I V is A+] s Cert[V is B I V is 
A] 
Therefore we essentially increased what is possible and 
decreased what is certain. 
There appears to be an alternative way of 
discounting a piece of evidence to reflect our lack of 
complete credibility in the information. This approach 
can consist of a probabilistic type of discounting. 
Assume we have a piece of evidence 
VisA 
which has a credibility a. An alternative way of 
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discounting is to assign a probability a that V is A is 
indeed correct and a probability I-a to the statement 
Vis X. 
This type of operation generates a Dempster-Shafer 
belief structure, a simple support function [I2, 16]: 
VisA a 
VisX 1 -a 
We note that in this case if our credibility is zero, we 
end up with the complete base set 
Vis X. 
while if a = I, we end up with the original piece of 
evidence, V is A. 
We recall that in the Dempster-Shafer framework 
for any subset B of X. we can define two set measures 
plausibility (PI) and belief (Bel) such that for any set B 
Pl(B) =a Poss[B/A) + (1 -a)Poss[B/X] 
Bel(B] = o.Cert(B/A] + 1-a Cert[B/X] 
where 
Cert(B) S Prob(B) S Pl(B). 
In the following, we shall assume A is our known 
proposition which has credibility a and B is some 
arbitrary proposition of interest. We shall assume that 
both A and B are normal, that is 
Maxx A(x) = 1 and Maxx B(x) = 1. 
We first note that if a =1 then 
Pl(B) = Poss(B/A] and Bel(B) = Cert[B/A]. 
Thus plausibility and possibility are effectively 
measuring the same concept while certainty and belief 
are measuring the same concept On the other hand if a 
= 0 then 
PI (B) = Poss[B!X) =I 
Cert(B) = CertrB!Xl =Minx B(x). 
Let us denote 
Since 
then 
Pla(B) = a Poss[BIAJ + (I -a) Poss[B/X] 
Bela(B) = a Cert [BIAJ + (I - a) Cert[B/X] 
Poss[B/X] = I 
Pla(B) = a Poss[BIA] + I - a. 
In the special case when a = 1, we shall drop the 
subscript. 
The following relationships hold for all A,B and a. 
Pl(B) s Pla(B) 
since 
Poss[BIA] sa Poss[BIA]. 
Furthennore 
Bel[BJ � Bela [B) 
since 
Cert[B/X] S Cert[B/A). 
These relationships indicate that the introduction of 
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discounting via this probabilistic method also results 
in an increase in uncertainty. 
The belief structure resulting from this discounting 
is a consonant belief structure [12] since 
A c X. As shown in Shafer [12] consonant belief 
structures have some very unique properties. In 
particular. for any consonant belief structure there exists 
a contour function F(x) such that 
F(x) =PI( {x} ). 
In our case 
F(x) = a A(x) + 1 - a 
The contour function has the characteristic that 
Pla(B) = Maxx[F(x) A B(x)] 
and since 
Bel (B) = 1 - PI(B) 
it follows that 
Bela(B) = 1 - Maxx[F(x) A B(x)). 
In our case this implies 
Pla(B) = Maxx[(a A(x) + (1- a)) A B(x)) 
Bela(B) = 1 - Maxx[(a. A(x) + (1- a.)) A B(x)] 
We next recall from the previous section that our 
methodology for discounting a piece of evidence 
VisA 
which had credibility a. was to form a new piece of 
evidence 
VisD 
such that each x e X 
D(x) = S( a,A(x)) 
where S is any arbitrary co t-norm. Let us consider the 
special t-conorm 
S(a,b) =a+ b - ab 
Using this operator 
D(x) =a+ A(x) - a. A(x) 
= a A(x) + {I - a.) 
From this we obtain 
Poss[B/D] = Maxx[(a A(x) +{I - a.)) A B(x)] 
Cert[B/D] = 1 - Maxx[(a. A(x) + (I - a.)) A B(x)] 
From this we easily see that 
Poss[B/D] = Pla,(B) 
Cert[B/DJ = Bela(B) 
Thus we see that the use of probabilistic type 
discounting can be seen as a special case of our original 
form of discounting with the appropriate selection of 
the operator S. 
There are a number of other factors we might want 
to consider in the formulation of credibility 
qualification. Assume we have a piece of evidence 
VisA 
obtained from some agent. It is conceivable that the 
agents credibility may be a function of the value x of 
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the base set X underlying V. That is, a particular 
source maybe very effective in analyzing information in 
some range of X but not as good in other ranges. This 
observation leads us to consider the case in which the 
credibility assigned a piece of evidence is a function of 
x, that is a. = h(x). In this situation 
D(x) = S(l - h(x), A(x)). 
There exists another consideration we may desire to 
include in our transformation. Assume V is some 
variable which takes its value in the base set X. 
Furthermore assume that X has some metric on it 
which enables us to measure a degree of proximity 
between any two points. Let 
p: X x X � [0, 1] 
where the larger the value p(x,y) the closer the two 
elements. Assume we have a piece of evidence 
VisA 
where A = {xo). That is, the evidence states that V is 
xo. Assume we have some credibility a. assigned to this 
statement. Then 
D{x) = S(l - a, A(x)). 
Furthermore, in this case we would get 
D(xo)= 1 
D(x) = 1 - a. for all x = xo. 
Thus all the values of x not equal to xo have the 
same value for D(x). In many situations this new D 
doesn't capture what we desire to happen. For example 
what may be a more appropriate formulation would be 
that D is around XO· That is we would like to "soften 
the edges" at xo rather then make everything the same. 
(See figure #2) 
Figure#2 
Thus in this case, we would like the discounting at 
a point x to be a function of the proximity of x to xo. 
In this situation, we could have a discounting factor h 
such that 
h(x) = f(ex, p(x,xo). 
The fonn of f will detennine the shape of D resulting 
from the discounting. 
More generally, if A is a fuzzy subset we would 
use the proximately of x to the subset, that is p(x.A). 
One requirement on f is that if ex = 0, f( ex,b )=0 for all b 
and if ex = I then f(ex,b) = 1 for all b. It would also 
appear that continuity would be a desirable requirement. 
Furthennore monotonicity on F is required in that if ex1 
> ex2 then 
f(ex1, b)<! f(ex2, b) 
and if b1 > � then 
f(a, b1) <! f(ex, �) 
5. Conclusion 
We have introduced a type of qualification which 
we called credibility qualification of a piece of evidence. 
We have used its close relationship to the idea of 
importance to provide a mechanism for formally 
manipulating these qualifications. We indicated how 
this type of qualification essentially results in a 
discounting of the given evidence in a manner inversely 
related to its credibility. Significantly we indicated how 
the credibility associated with a piece of evidence can be 
obtained as a function of the compatibility of the given 
evidence with other pieces of more established evidence. 
This idea of relative credibility is very much in the 
spirit of nonmonotonic and default reasoning. 
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